

STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

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| 1 | DFMI Dept Head | Approve | <i>John H. Modinger, Lt Col 15 Sep 2014</i> | 6 | | | |
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SUMMARY

1. PURPOSE: To provide security and policy review of the attached documents prior to public release.
2. BACKGROUND: Lt Col John H. Modinger, Assistant Professor, DFMI has written an article for submission to a civil-military related journal.

Abstract: Lt Col Modinger's paper discusses the military profession and suggested changes to "keep it professional," and also discusses public dissent as it relates to the military, particularly retired "flag" officers. His views represent his own thoughts as an academic interest item and contribution to the debate on civil-military relations. There are no statements making any judgments about Air Force or DOD policy and thus, there should be no objections regarding public release of Lt Col Modinger's views.

Note that the appropriate disclaimer will be added to the document prior to publication, to read as follows: "the views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the US Air Force Academy, the US Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the US government."

Release Information: Lt Col Modinger will submit his article to an appropriate military-related journal for publication, date and status TBD.

Recommended Distribution Statement: Distribution A, Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

3. RECOMMENDATION: Sign Approve/Review blocks above indicating document is suitable for public release. Suitability is based solely on the document being unclassified, not jeopardizing DOD interests, nor inaccurately portraying official policy.

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The Military Profession: At a Crossroads

Lt Col John H. Modinger

PREFACE

This paper has two purposes: First, to propose some changes within the military profession to keep it “professional,” amidst numerous “occupational” trends taking hold within the services; second, to explore the issue of public dissent as it relates to the military, most notably by retired flag officers, and recommend steps to preserve the trust and respect our military enjoys vis-à-vis its client, the American people.

One might ask “Why is a military member writing about the military profession? Isn’t this properly in the realm of academics, who can be objective about the institution?” Decades ago, scholars like Huntington, Janowitz, Brodie, and Bradford did tackle the thorny issue of civil-military relations, depicting its evolution, clarifying the inner workings, identifying responsibilities, and sometimes speculating about the institution’s future direction. These scholars saw the end of World War II as an “inflection point.”¹ That event, coupled with the onset of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and possible mass extinction, and later, the creation of an All-Volunteer Force (AVF), drove them, at different times, to ponder and extrapolate on the military profession and its relationship to its civilian masters. However, since the creation of an AVF, the volume of writing on the military profession has notably declined. As a society, Andrew Bacevich effectively argues, Americans have become comfortable with—actually, complacent about—the idea of a professional military, one in which less than one percent of the population serves, in any capacity.²

But even assuming Bacevich is correct—that American society has become apathetic and unconcerned about military professionalism because they essentially have “no skin in the game”—much has happened since 1973: The implosion of the Soviet menace; adoption of a more activist and muscular foreign policy; a proliferation of asymmetric threats; pulsating spasms of innovation; exploding social networking possibilities; and an omnipresent media. And yet, despite these

enormous and impactful developments, there remains a troubling lack of attention being paid to the profession at large and the impact of those changes. Scholarly research is largely devoted to other topics nowadays. To be blunt, who's going to set about reframing and redefining the profession amidst all these changes, if not us? We shouldn't stand around waiting for others to redefine us. We must embrace the challenge from within.

INTRODUCTION

In Tennyson's famed “The Charge of the Light Brigade” we are offered a glimpse of the military that is, at once, both touching and disturbing.

*Theirs not to make reply,
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.³*

Today's military is almost unrecognizable compared to the one which existed in Tennyson's day, but the image is a powerful, lingering one. Although loyalty, obedience,⁴ courage and determination remain cornerstones of the military profession, the expectations we have of military leaders have swollen, mostly because the stakes involved have grown exponentially. Not surprisingly, how we define professionalism has evolved, too, and must continue to do so. Brigadier General Malham Wakin, a philosopher at heart, argued, decades ago, that *“We are concerned ... about a picture of a profession that leaves us feeling ... a [person] must give up [his/her] rationality ... very creativeness, the source of ... dignity ... in order to play [the] role[of] a soldier.”⁵* Such a view was probably prevalent outside the military (and maybe somewhat inside it, too), back then, but today the public's image of the military has improved greatly, though misperceptions still abound. While today's military stresses continuing education, expertise and professionalization, and demands from its members integrity, selflessness, and striving for excellence in all endeavors, many other conceptions about the attitudes and substance of “the military mind” remain entrenched in certain pockets—that it's antidemocratic, warlike, authoritarian, and realist (seeing war as

inevitable). Furthermore, portions of the American electorate believe that discipline and obedience, while essential for the effective operation of the military enterprise, destroy creative thinking and dispose of moral virtue.⁶ While we, as a corporate entity, quickly dismiss such held perceptions as nonsensical or absurd, it would do us well to always guard against feeding such views, by the integrity of our deliberations and by our actions, wherever they persist. Ultimately, integrity, rather than obedience, may be the most important military virtue, the one upon which all others depend.⁷

FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE

Politically

Samuel Huntington believed the American constitutional system inevitably draws U.S. military leaders into the political process. And he viewed the state of civil-military relations as a reflection of the degree to which the military participated in the political process. The degree could be depicted along a continuum with subjective and objective relationships defining the endpoints. A subjective relationship is one where the military is closely integrated into and participates within the social system. In essence, it describes the militia mentality that served America for much of its history. By contrast, the objective relationship is probably more representative of the all-volunteer force (AVF), which originated in 1973, though neither is a perfect fit. Politicians and military members have their respective fields and there is little overlap; the military member stands apart and focuses on developing expertise in the profession of arms, or to borrow Huntington's phrase, "*the management of violence.*" Here, military "professionalism" is maximized, some would argue. However, a truly "objective" form of civ-mil relations is impossible, since the military is compelled to establish priorities, propose budgets and advise the President, among other things, all of which places it between the Executive and Legislative arms of government. "*The separation of powers is a perpetual invitation, if not an irresistible force, drawing military leaders into political conflicts.*"⁸

The modern security environment beckons a transformation of skill sets when it comes to military professionalism, especially among military leaders atop the institution. And yet, simultaneously, senior leaders must reemphasize the importance of preserving the bonds of trust between the military institution and those it serves, lest its esteem be tarnished, and, subsequently, its influence diminished. *“Civil-military relations … [are] the most fundamental component of American military professionalism and the one most overlooked. And it is the arena where our military leaders seem to fail most often, or at least most spectacularly.”*⁹ Though the military must always remain apolitical, it cannot escape politics, since military policy is formulated via a political process, a competitive and often contentious one.

Structurally

On a separate front, a discernible trend afoot within the military over the last quarter century, which threatens to convert our “profession” or “calling” into more of an “occupation,” tugs at the very heart of what defines military service. Charles Moskos called our attention to this budding paradigm shift almost forty years ago, in the wake of a transition to an AVF. Since then, the trend has accelerated, albeit without the purposeful or intentional support of the services themselves which loathe any movement towards more of an employer-employee relationship that would undermine the conventional, but increasingly hybrid, arrangement. Can this metamorphosis be halted?

To evaluate the degree to which that shift has occurred, it’s worthwhile to consider Moskos’ working definitions of a calling, a profession, and an occupation. To Moskos, a *calling* rests on institutional values, i.e. *“a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good … [and] usually enjoys high esteem from the larger community because it is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and complete dedication to one’s role.”*¹⁰ Juxtaposed alongside that is a *profession*, which implies *“specialized expertise, i.e. a skill level formally accredited after long, intensive, academic training.”*¹¹ Finally, an *occupation* is *“legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e. prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies.”*¹² Clearly, the armed forces contain elements of all three

definitions, with notable variation between services. For Moskos, it was clear, long ago, that the military was trending toward becoming an occupation. Nevertheless, he recognized the potential pitfalls in such a migration. Today, one can see this evolutionary change reflected in many facets of the profession: Topical publications such as the *Air Force Times* which seemingly exists to trumpet pay raises, a multiplicity of options available to service members, post-service employment opportunities, and the latest personnel shenanigans; the plethora of monetary inducements necessary to entice many, with specialized skills in critical areas, to stay in service, establishing unequal compensation packages across officer and enlisted pay grades; the rampant outsourcing of many previously in-house activities to contractors, creating parallel structures with dissimilar compensation and responsibilities vis-à-vis those in uniform. These developments, and others, will continue to threaten the existing corporateness of the institution. They could also endanger the public favor the military currently enjoys. Currently, the public tends to view the military more as a calling; however, greater public attention toward military matters and awareness of what they get for their expenditure could elicit a more cynical attitude, amidst tight budgets, a weak labor market, and semi-defined threats.

To mitigate the slide toward ever-greater occupation-oriented encroachment on the profession, some structural changes might be in order.

First, thought should be given to creating a more distinct cleavage between service-related, civilianized components of the military infrastructure and the more operationally distinct ones. In effect, the scope of what constitutes military tasks should be narrowed. This clearly brings with it headaches in terms of deployments and having contractors even more embedded with military units than is already the case, but that's a problem the military is already wrestling with; contractors will not be eliminated from future military operations; indeed, the dependence on them only seems to be growing as systems and support infrastructures become more complex. It may involve wholesale changes to the way we deploy forces and the rules of engagement under which they operate. Nevertheless, the military is utterly dependent upon civilians for a host of tasks and this won't be changing, so why not embrace the reality rather than holding on to a costly and outdated paradigm.

Second, maintain the paternalistic retirement system, but shape it to better contain costs through efficiency measures and downsizing of the active component. Further erosion of the profession risks corrosion of the bedrock foundations. Better to have a smaller force, used more judiciously, than a larger one robbed of its cohesion because of an onslaught of minor cuts that cumulatively degrade both its effectiveness and professionalism.

Third, move away from the habit of NCOs (and, to a lesser extent, officers) becoming administrators. Let those administrative functions be handled more by the parallel structures discussed in the first point above. Not only would civilianization of those responsibilities likely result in greater efficiencies, but it would avoid watering down “professional” responsibilities.

Lastly, by changing recruitment approaches, allowing for briefer commitments in exchange for educational benefits, hiring preferences, some minor severance (but not any retirement benefits) or a combination thereof, more attention could be focused on combat arms and non-technical career fields, particularly in the enlisted ranks. Some may argue this plays right into the occupational trends afoot. They would be correct insofar as the services would be enticing service in exchange for something. However, this would likely broaden the spectrum of recruits, presumably reduce long-term demands on the health care and retirement systems due to shorter enlistments, and return the profession to its roots.

Admittedly, such changes aren’t terribly appealing, but they may be inevitable in light of the monumental social changes taking place and the diverse array of unconventional threats we now face for the foreseeable future. In short, the services can adapt and attempt to shape the changes in ways that mitigate tumult while preserving core priorities and missions, or they can endeavor to maintain the status-quo—a noble, but likely futile aspiration.

Retired Army Colonel, and now professor, Andrew Bacevich, has highlighted many of the insidious effects of an AVF. And while many agree with his assertions, many of those same people remain uncomfortable with some of his solutions. Essentially, Bacevich argues a plutocracy—a country or society governed by the wealthy—has taken hold and is leading the country toward disaster, with the help of public apathy. In short, he claims “*Americans have largely forfeited their say.*”¹³

The renowned General George C. Marshall claimed “*a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War.*”¹⁴ But Bacevich correctly points out that since 9/11, Americans have, by and large, refuted Marshall’s statement. Iraq and Afghanistan are testimony to that new reality. He insists what was essentially a political solution for Nixon—the AVF—was, in fact, “*the creation of an endemic fiscal and moral catastrophe.*”¹⁵ While that may be true, the fact remains we can fight long wars, “*as long as it’s carried out by volunteers and contractors and … paid for on credit.*”¹⁶ A former Johnson Administration aide put it more bluntly. “*By removing the middle class from even the threat of conscription, we remove perhaps the greatest inhibition on a President’s decision to go to war.*”¹⁷ Another stinging critique of the AVF came from none-other-than General Stanley McChrystal who said “*with an all-volunteer force the American people don’t have any ‘skin in the game,’ so once a war is ongoing it’s much easier to muddle about with an ill-defined mission set while contractors get richer, little gets achieved, and soldiers get killed and maimed.*”¹⁸ Of course, reinstating a draft doesn’t necessitate a massive force. Instead, we could possibly engineer a system that diversifies the pool of recruits without massively expanding the force and, in the process, reinvigorate public interest in how the military is used to support policy objectives. This could, in turn, diminish the militarization of American foreign policy that has occurred since the demise of the Soviet menace.

NEEDED ADAPTATIONS

After the Cold War ended, and maybe more profoundly after 9/11, it became clear the world had changed—dramatically. While the threat of total war was low, a quest for “security” from an array of emerging threats, many unconventional or asymmetric, took center stage. Today, even overwhelming military power is perceived as limited in what it can accomplish. Consequently, the long evolving “*frame of reference*” with regard to winning our wars “*is [now] less about ‘victory’ and more about ‘prevailing’ in a globalized competitive environment.*”¹⁹ That said, the budgetary, professional development, and mission mindsets of the military profession have evolved at a decidedly more lethargic

pace than the world around us, which has impaired our interests and curtailed our prospects. For the health of the profession and our longer term security, change is necessary.

Let's tackle each of these “mindsets” separately. First, we are living on borrowed time with regard to budgets, even though the portion of the defense budget within the Federal budget has shrunk since the height of the Cold War. We must radically alter the way we equip our forces. This must be seen as a serious part of our professional responsibility in a way it has not up to now. It is not just about doing the same, or more, with less. It’s about being responsible stewards of the funds we’ve been entrusted to spend wisely. To date, as a profession, we have failed at this responsibility, sometimes egregiously so. Undoubtedly, there are many causes for the acquisitions debacle, but far and away, the primary blame falls on the military for failing to adequately balance performance and cost.²⁰ For decades, the military has sought to maximize performance with an untamed zeal that trumped cost considerations time and time again. The refrain was often “*we demand the best, damn the cost.*” Not only is that an abandonment of our fiscal responsibility, but also our strategy obligations. Can we really be saying that the current process is sustainable or sane? The acquisition fiasco has gotten so bad that by one estimate, projecting out the reduced-quantity curve for fighter aircraft (due to ever-rising costs), by 2054, the services will be able to afford one aircraft per year (to be shared among all the services)?²¹ How crazy is that? As mentioned, the boondoggle has many fathers, but the biggest cause far and away is the military’s insatiable desire to make upgrades to the programs while seemingly turning a blind eye to financial implications as evidenced by the massive, recurring, and needless cost overruns on virtually every major program under its control. It belies our espoused core values, too. Where is the *integrity* of the process? How can an incredibly dysfunctional acquisition process which threatens to leave us at great risk because we will no longer be able to afford adequate numbers of X, be inflated in such a way that the institution carries on as if all is well in hand? The parochial interests of the services, let alone those of the Congress and industry, compromise the idea of *service* to the nation before [a particular service or pet interest or one’s pocketbook]. Disturbingly, fully 80 percent of retired three- and four-star generals and admirals migrate to defense related industries upon retirement with little reproach.²² Today, the concern is not a

coup, as it was in the early days of the republic, but that the military and the industrial complex that serves it will, as Eisenhower warned us, “*drive policy and become an end rather than a means, shaping the political landscape to their interests.*”²³ Finally, does the current system even remotely resemble “*Excellence in All We Do*”? Of course it doesn’t.

A second “mindset” that must be addressed is the professional development one. For far too long, the promotion system has rewarded traditional pathways while paying lip service to the need to diversify the cadre of senior leaders. It’s not to say that some with unique backgrounds don’t make it up the chain, only to emphasize the continuing conventional pedigree of most that climb to the upper rungs of command. Unfortunately, the conventional pedigree is often not as well-suited to the conundrums of the modern security environment that demand a more nuanced approach to solving the challenges presented, both on the battlefield and in the corridors of power in Washington. “*The political, scientific, economic, social, and cultural implications of policy-level, military decisions made today must be studied and evaluated by the most knowledgeable minds in the nation, minds that must also belong to [people] in uniform.*”²⁴

This leads to the third, and final, mindset. Many of the struggles the military is, or will be, involved in, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, will require perseverance, not just from the military, but from the President, the Congress, the American people, and coalition partners. Thus, military practitioners must develop political acumen, connecting-the-dots that feed national endurance in the face of inevitable conflicts we find ourselves engaged in across the globe. Shrewd enemies recognize any lack of will on our part (as a nation) as a vulnerability to be continually exploited and leveraged. Military leaders must be adept at recognizing how critical their role (on and off the battlefield) will be in sustaining national focus and will.

The inescapable reality is that today the leaders of the military must be as competent in the halls of Congress and elsewhere as they are across the global commons.²⁵ But that can be a challenge given some prevalent tendencies within the military.

First, being apolitical does not mean the military should shun political education and awareness as it applies to both domestic and international issues. Speaking in general terms, ignorance when the mission requires awareness of political sensitivities and repercussions can be devastating toward mission accomplishment. We've gotten better at this, but there's still much room for improvement.

A second tendency is to preach Clausewitzian thinking while failing to practice it. “*To view military victory as an end in itself, ignoring war's function as an instrument of policy*”²⁶ is foolish and wasteful. And yet the frustrations with the limitations imposed by political restrictions on military operations have not disappeared over time. Consider General Wesley Clarke's statement about the 1999 Kosovo campaign: “*Using military force effectively requires departing from the political dynamic and following the so-called 'principles of war'.*”²⁷ Somewhat conversely, recall the storm of criticism from military and civilian corners following the restrictive rules of engagement put in place by General McChrystal, upheld by his successor General Petraeus. These commanders understood that decimating the enemy with the unrestricted use of airpower could win the battle but subsequently aid in losing the war due to excessive civilian casualties. This awareness of the bigger picture seems to be absent at times; hence the *reactive* moves toward greater nuance after the fact. If our wars of the future are often going to be about “*winning hearts and minds*,” it stands to reason this nuance should be present from the outset in most settings, not later after the often needless damage has been inflicted. Critics may argue that is easier said than done, but it can also be an excuse, at times, to act more and think less.

Finally, the military leadership is hardwired to produce short-term gains easily transferable to the next day's briefing slides. The “*results orientation*”²⁸ may create impatience with interagency or nongovernmental organization efforts that produce transparent or long-term effects—a factor worth considering. In short, the characteristics that often define “*the military approach*” work well to accomplish military ends, but can conflict with desired political outcomes. It's not that the military can't achieve political mission accomplishment, but rather the military approach reveals limitations. Undoubtedly, military leaders with high political IQs (for example, Eisenhower, Powell, and Petraeus) do

exist, but they are the exception rather than the rule. American military culture values, and is more likely to produce, a Patton.²⁹

The military has proven itself adaptable on a host of issues, but it has struggled in some notable areas. First, it has a tendency to fixate, in terms of spending priorities, on wars of preference—“War [*should be*] clean, independent of politics, and fought with big battalions.”³⁰ Not only does this result in us equipping for all wars largely the same way, but also reflects a persistent refusal to fully embrace lessons that many would rather forget—very costly in terms of lives and treasure.

Second, as the military struggles to re-conceptualize the notion of professionalism in a rapidly changing world, one gets the feeling it does so grudgingly or half-heartedly, longing for bygone times and more defined parameters. The military culture at large reflects that soul-searching.

Third, the profession must fully accept the idea that civilian counterparts complement the work of DoD rather than get in the way. Progress has been made here, but much remains to be done. Obviously, this appreciation must run in both directions, since the security and stability needed to accomplish changes is often only made possible through the measured application of military power. We must reorient ourselves. Diplomacy must take a bigger role in addressing the global issues we wrestle with, and the DoD should thoroughly embrace such change, even if it comes out of hide in terms of the money to fund a more robust State Department presence globally. The Honorable Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense (among many other titles he’s held), supports this proposition. Too often since the end of the Cold War, national leaders have reached for the sword before fully utilizing the other tools in our instruments of national power tool bag. Not only is the military not the best choice in many instances, but it’s akin to using a sledge hammer when a scalpel is called for. Our military has done an admirable job—in the field—of flexing to accommodate the growing myriad of things it is asked to do, but that doesn’t diminish the fact it is better at core functions than peripheral tasks. If the military, collectively, prefers to reduce the number of taskings it is called upon to handle, it stands to reason that augmenting the capabilities of the State Department is a step in the right direction—strengthen other tools that may preclude the use of force, while maintaining the coercive power inherent in latent military power. But it

can't stop there. The military must really focus on better integration of other agencies into its operations when deployed.

Fourth, military leaders at every level need to comprehend that "fourth generation warfare ... [is a] political and not [primarily] a military struggle."³¹ In this new type of warfare, the line between war and politics, combatants and civilians blurs noticeably. Information, more specifically *how and in what context it is reported*, represents a latent power which can quickly and overtly confound one's purposes in the hands of the enemy or seemingly neutral parties. Not surprisingly, ubiquitous media coverage plays a crucial role here. Military public affairs outlets still struggle with the balance between candor and security, but more often than not come across as stiff and evasive. The practice of embedding reporters, while not new, was enhanced during the Iraq invasion. Overall, this was a step in the right direction, though critics abound.³² However, in conjunction with alternatives providing more freedom to journalists but less access to the military and considerably less safety, the practice can serve both military and journalistic needs. But more remains to be done to facilitate a better relationship with the press without compromising national security.

Fifth, rampant over-classification of so much DoD information is both unnecessary and self-defeating.³³ Though due diligence is certainly required, the widespread practice of "When in doubt, classify it" needs to be applied more judiciously, lest it continue to feed perceptions of nefarious intent or conduct in some corners. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld concurred. "*I have long believed that too much material is classified across the Federal government as a general rule.*"³⁴ Another critic was blunter. "*No one is held accountable for classifying too much. But in a democracy, blocking access to information is a momentous thing. It shouldn't be easy. It's not quite a rubber stamp, but it's not too far off. Classifiers are not required to identify the national security harm that could result from releasing the information.*"³⁵

Finally, the military institution must address its conception of what military success looks like going forward—or risk being forever frustrated. At the same time, civilian leaders need to establish political expectations and reasonably defined end states that would constitute political success. This is

often ignored for political convenience, but it ends up creating confusion for commanders. In the end, “*The object of war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.*”³⁶

PRESERVING TRUST

The American military enjoys an unparalleled degree of trust and respect when compared to similar institutions around the globe, let alone other governmental institutions here at home. Of course, it wasn’t always that way. Nevertheless, it is now and has been so for roughly three decades. But that doesn’t imply it may always remain so, especially if it is taken for granted or is not nurtured by those in uniform, particularly the leadership. In recent years, most notably during the “Revolt of the Generals,”³⁷ there has been an uptick in the occurrence of retired flag officers³⁸ publicly dissenting from the policies of civilian masters who ultimately preside over the DoD. And these reactions are intensifying with time.³⁹

West Point professor Don Snider raised a key question in the wake of this so-called “revolt”:

*Should the professions’ ethics evolve to accommodate in the future dissent similar to that seen in the “Revolt of the Generals,” or should they evolve, as they have in the past, to strongly discourage such public dissent by uniformed leaders, active and retired, especially during wartime?*⁴⁰

As Michael Desch rightly points out, the tensions in civil-military relations hardly started with Iraq—that quagmire simply exposed a rift which had existed for decades.⁴¹ In most instances it is mild, but on rare occasions like the expansion of involvement in Vietnam and Iraq at the height of the chaos (2005-06), it can be decidedly more palpable.

The end of the Cold War exposed a growing dissonance between civilian government officials and military leaders in terms of how and when the military should be used. As the military was increasingly deployed to handle a range of military operations other than conventional conflict, the gap grew. Iraq (and to a lesser extent Afghanistan), in the wake of the quick conventional operations at

the outset, brought that divide into sharp focus. Indeed, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group strongly recommended that “*the new Secretary of Defense should make every effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an environment in which the senior military feel free to offer independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President and the National Security Council.*”⁴² That clearly implied an unhealthy relationship existed. The question is why. Well, the Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz experiment which involved not only getting into the details of military planning, but also a rather brusque style certainly rubbed many in the military wrong. However, that only scratches the surface. Suffice it to say there were many contributing factors that brought that schism to the fore, but they’re beyond the scope of this discussion. Michael Desch believes that if civilians give “due deference” to military professional advice in the tactical and operational realms in return for “complete” military subordination in the grand strategic and political realms, things will go much smoother. But such a prescription goes too far.

In today’s incredibly complex global environment, too many issues touch upon others to think there can be a clean break in terms of respective “realms.” A tapestry of transnational relations, speed-of-light developments, integrated commerce infrastructure, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, etc.—all of which have both a political and a military dimension to them—demand a more nuanced approach than Desch’s formula. This is not to suggest that, at the end of the day, political leaders cannot just refuse to accept the advice military leaders provide. Certainly they can. But his “due deference” caveat is vague and “complete” subordination in the grand strategic and political realms risks the very type of disconnect Clausewitz would have cautioned against. No one is suggesting the military not subordinate itself to its political masters. Rather, Desch’s proposed solution would fail to leverage aspects of the very professionalism military leaders can, and should, deliver in today’s more complex strategic environment.

To better appreciate this position, a look back may prove valuable. From the outset, the senior military leadership was unenthusiastic about committing U.S. ground forces to Vietnam and many had serious reservations about the strategies concocted in Washington. By mid-1967, discontent had gotten

so pronounced that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reportedly considered resigning en masse.⁴³ But in the end, they did not. And junior officers were watching and, upon reflection, were stunned, upset and determined not to repeat what they perceived as a dereliction of duty,⁴⁴ if they were in charge someday. General (and later Secretary of State) Colin Powell, in his memoir, poignantly reflected that “*as a corporate entity, the military failed to talk straight to its political supervisors or itself. The top leadership never went to the secretary of defense or the President and said, ‘This war is unwinnable the way we are fighting it.’*”⁴⁵ *Dereliction of Duty*, H.R. McMaster’s sobering tale of the American loss in Vietnam, crystallized that message, implying that unqualified allegiance to senior military leadership and, by inference, the Commander-in-Chief, needed to be considered alongside the stakes involved. In short, candor, rather than a rigid “can do” attitude toward the top echelons of civilian power within the DoD and the White House would have spared us that debacle. This “lesson” was cradled and nurtured by that upcoming generation of officers and passed down. It was a lesson best codified in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. The principal themes of that doctrine were “*the need for clear goals, the backing of the American public, and the application of overwhelming force.*”⁴⁶

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Powell opposed the use of force to overturn the aggression, opting instead for diplomatic and economic sanctions. He was clearly in the minority within the Bush 41 administration.⁴⁷ When later asked about his stance, Powell declared “*As a mid-level career officer, I had been appalled at the docility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, fighting the war in Vietnam without ever pressing the political leaders to lay out clear objectives for them.*”⁴⁸ When it mattered, and he felt the objectives were unclear, he wasn’t afraid to speak to power. After making his position clear to the President, and the meeting broke up, his boss, Secretary of Defense Cheney chastised his outspokenness. “*Colin, you’re Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. You’re not secretary of state. You’re not the national security advisor. And you’re not secretary of defense. So stick to military matters.*”⁴⁹ But Powell did the right thing. Cheney may have wanted him to stay in his box,⁵⁰ but Powell had a larger responsibility—and he was fulfilling it. While Powell’s advice to Bush 41 was ultimately not accepted, Powell stood up for what he believed in, based on his decades-long experience and, more importantly, the responsibility he had as the

primary military advisor to the Commander-in-Chief as redefined by the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986, making him the most powerful chairman in the history of the JCS. Later, though not agreeing with the decision, he helped orchestrate a spectacular military effort, using overwhelming force.

Some have criticized the decision to halt the ground offensive portion of Desert Storm after just 100 hours. More than anyone else, it was Powell that led the charge to do so. He was led to that conclusion because of his long-evolving belief that “*generals should think not only about military maneuvers and tactics but also about how a conflict can finally be terminated.*”⁵¹ “*We were fighting a limited war under a limited mandate for a limited purpose, which was soon going to be achieved. I thought that the people responsible ought to start thinking about how it would end.*”⁵² Many contend that had combat operations been allowed to continue, Saddam could have been finished off, but those critics often overlook other considerations, to include the fact it would have left Iran in a markedly better position to coerce regional actors. Another critique of the operation revolves around Schwarzkopf’s consent to an Iraqi demand to be allowed to fly their helicopters within the declared “no fly zones” established after the cessation of combat operations. Here, Powell is probably open to some criticism, since Wolfowitz and Scowcroft encouraged Cheney and Secretary of State Jim Baker to amend the agreement in light of what Hussein was doing under this arrangement—waging war on his Shiite enemies in the south of the country who’d arisen attempting to overthrow his regime once and for all. In this instance, Powell and Cheney argued it would undermine Schwarzkopf’s authority—a weak rationale, given the stakes involved. In reality, the decision not to intervene was based more on realism and balance-of-power. If the Shiites prevailed, it would upset the Gulf States and U.S. interests there. It was also suspected that the Shiites in the south were allied with Iran—this turned out to be a false assumption. The point of this entire discussion being, professionalism must encompass more than military tasks. It must meld military expertise with a thorough grasp of the larger ramifications of using military force. Though the President rejected Powell’s initial advice concerning what to do about reversing the situation in Kuwait, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine would largely endure until the Bush 43 Administration arrived on the scene.

In the years that followed Desert Storm, there was a dramatic increase in the tempo of operational deployments for things other than war thanks in part to the collapse of the Soviet Union. But no intervention since Vietnam would prove as all-encompassing or divisive as Iraq—specifically, the stability operations that would subsequently consume years and cost America so much.

The Bush Administration had an ambitious defense agenda—Shake up the establishment and rein in the military,⁵³ chiefly by reinvigorating the principle of civilian oversight and authority while turning DoD toward so-called “transformative” technologies, systems, and processes. Even before taking office, Bush indicated one of his Defense Secretary’s first jobs would be “*to challenge the status quo inside the Pentagon.*” For his part, Rumsfeld made it clear he was willing—and eager—to do that.⁵⁴ Though the 9/11 attacks delayed a dramatic confrontation with the military, the forced intermission only put it off.

In the upheaval that followed 9/11, offers of military help came pouring in, especially from European allies, but something strange happened. The U.S. military—not the Bush White House—declined much of the military assistance being offered. There were at least two reasons for this; the first was largely operational. Since the end of the Cold War, European militaries had largely failed to keep up with U.S. technological advancements, so their militaries were often unable to effectively operate alongside U.S forces. A second reason was political. One French diplomat termed it the “Kosovo syndrome.” In that operation, American military leaders found the process of seeking consensus within NATO for military actions in the Balkans maddening.⁵⁵ Now, tasked with quickly launching a war on the other side of the globe in a landlocked wasteland, American military leaders viewed the prospect of working with European forces (minus a few exceptions) not as a help but as a nuisance. Militarily, this was understandable, but politically, it was a dubious approach to take, since the administration’s hyped “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) would require the cooperation of these same nations on a host of issues, not just military ones. As Churchill famously said, “*There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them.*”⁵⁶ This needless slight would only further isolate the U.S.

politically over time. In the end, most of these countries participated anyway, but only after the U.S., specifically the American military, had committed an unforced error.

Once the Taliban were decimated, the White House struggled to articulate the next step in the GWOT. With time, however, it began to crystallize within the neoconservative wing of the administration—Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Many uniformed military leaders couldn’t digest the administration’s line of reasoning that Iraq was the next logical target in the GWOT, but any early dissent was largely confined to disgruntled rumblings and/or leaks. In response, Rumsfeld and his key deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, took perceived military intransigence regarding GWOT priorities as an excuse to become involved in the military “realm” to a degree not seen since the McNamara years to overcome what they perceived to be rampant service parochialism and bureaucratic inertia.

In terms of both content and style, Bush’s senior civilian leaders within the Pentagon were increasingly at odds with the military hierarchy. This was best exemplified by Wolfowitz’s dismissive comments about Army Chief of Staff Shinseki’s personal assessment regarding the necessary manpower for stability operations following Saddam’s overthrow; Wolfowitz’s “*wildly off the mark*”⁵⁷ comment would prove wrong—dead wrong, and over time, further alienate the military hierarchy. The light footprint Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were aiming for in both Afghanistan and Iraq reflected a powerful conviction in the efficacy of technology and the desire to do things more efficiently. In effect, the civilian leadership of the Pentagon was intent on using combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as test beds for their future-oriented philosophy. In a 2002 interview, Wolfowitz, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, albeit speaking about Vietnam, said the U.S. effort there seemed like “*an overexpenditure of American power.*”⁵⁸ It was illustrative of his thinking about America’s newest wars as well—lean on force, confident that speed, agility, and technology would more than make up for manpower.

Later, when operations in Iraq ran headlong into a budding insurgency and sectarian violence, finger pointing started, albeit from the retired ranks of senior officers. A particularly stinging rebuke came from the retired JCS Director of Operations, a Marine three-star general, who exclaimed “*... the commitment of forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province*

*of those who have never had to execute these missions—or bury the results.*⁵⁹ He, along with several others, openly called for Rumsfeld's resignation. It is important to note that all these officers were retired.

The real issue is whether these retired officers speaking out threatens the bonds of trust between both the civilians with authority over the military and the American public. Probably not, so long as the active duty flag officers frequently, clearly and explicitly emphasize to the media and the public that these retired generals and admirals, while free to comment and critique, do not represent the services, which are sworn to salute and obey the orders they are given, regardless of their personal opinions. But the word "probably" is the operative word here, in that if this type of behavior becomes routine, it would, most definitely, threaten that trust.

Major General (Ret) Paul Eaton, writing in *Joint Force Quarterly*, brings up an interesting dynamic in reference to the whole issue of retired officers speaking out in public about concerns they had regarding the prosecution of the war in Iraq. He points out that while his assessment of Rumsfeld's performance in the *New York Times* was viewed by many as an inappropriate means of influence, the picture of a Lieutenant General in uniform appearing on Fox News to defend the Secretary of Defense from the retired generals was not discussed.⁶⁰ Isn't using the military in that capacity, as the Pentagon did, a much more political act? Also, consider the men behind the troop surge in Iraq. Retired General Jack Keane, together with the American Enterprise Institute's Fred Kagan, went around Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney to convince Bush 43 to increase the force presence by 30,000.⁶¹ Though many believe the surge worked, what does it portend for the future of civilian-military relations when retired officers circumvent the chain-of-command to advance their agenda, especially, if it were to go bad? Then the military would be seen not just as the servant of a failed policy, but the driving force behind it—in essence, a political animal despite its pledge to be apolitical.

The true risk is that the military becomes politicized. In turn, that politicization could lead to litmus tests on sensitive political issues when promoting flag officers. The case of the 2006 so-called "Revolt of the Generals" probably resulted in Mr. Rumsfeld remaining in office for 4-6 months longer

than he otherwise would have. Undeniably, Rumsfeld had become a lightning rod for attacks on the Bush Administration's policies, but the president was not going to accept Rumsfeld's resignation in seeming response to the calls by those retired general officers for him to step down. It would have established a terrible precedent.⁶²

In the last major dust up between disgruntled senior military leaders and their civilian masters, no officer still serving felt compelled to do something dramatic enough on their own, or in concert with peers, to raise the national consciousness about what they might have felt was impending disaster. Given the dubious results achieved in Afghanistan and Iraq, should they have?

There is much at stake when an officer decides to resign, rather than retire. In resigning, an officer forfeits his retirement benefits, though it certainly makes a more powerful statement. Unfortunately, too often, the words "resign" and "retire" are interchangeably used, leading to confusion. Undoubtedly, senior officer resignation would be a way to pressure the President short of disobedience, but the long-term consequence of such action would be to dilute military influence among civilian decision-makers. If those decision-makers come to believe flag officers will possibly use resignation as a weapon, officials will do one of two things: Not seek military advice or choose those deemed more compliant to serve in critical positions. Either option courts disaster.

We shouldn't expect too many, if any, to resign in order to make a point (unless, maybe, they're independently wealthy—think Billy Mitchell). Of course, Mitchell didn't resign or retire. He was court martialed. Today, Billy Mitchell is widely revered for his stand and the accuracy of many of his predictions long before they came to pass. The military weathered the storm then, just as it weathered the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals" back in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Of course, the media's reach was considerably more circumscribed when compared to today, so the impact upon trust was considerably more muted. The "Revolt of the Admirals" smacked of parochialism. Mitchell's antagonistic approach could also be construed as parochial, but he did manage to energize thought and galvanize those fighting for ideas that were enlightened. Maybe the latest episode only served to swing the pendulum back towards the middle. But it's worth remembering that more is at stake than just the issue of the day.

The trust civilian leadership places in the military, to say nothing of that given by the public at large, is a precious commodity, not to be causally taken for granted. If not nourished and protected, by those inside and outside the service, it can wither. Trust is easily lost, and hard to reestablish. The American people, in the wake of Vietnam (*The Pentagon Papers*) and Watergate, lost faith in the Federal Government at large on a massive scale; events like Iran-Contra, the Lewinsky scandal, Iraq, and Katrina only exacerbated that downfall. However, the military, despite being executors of government policy, largely escaped the negative downward spiral of trust between the people and the government after slowly rising, like a phoenix, from the ashes of the Vietnam debacle, where the government and the military were both seen by many as having violated the American people's trust. The point here is this: Trust is conditional. It can be lost, and lost quickly, if not treasured and nurtured by consistently doing what is right. The military must continue its strict adherence to apolitical behavior by its serving members and hand down stiff penalties for those who violate the tenet.

While an officer may be able to steer policy in the short-term by leveraging information and prestige, political responsibility will damage the military's long-term ability to secure the nation's interests, potentially triggering a sustained cycle of institutional decline. ... Getting out from under policy delegation and responsibility can be tricky, but officers need the acumen to recognize it, the wisdom to fear it, and the political skills to resist it. ... This reputation [for trust and respect] and moral authority would not survive if the military acted as a political branch and took greater responsibility for policy.⁶³

Occasionally, it may be that the person speaking out was on to something, but more often than not, such actions corrode the special trust given to the institution. Better to retire than continue "serving" while secretly leaking information or deriding policy in other ways. Speaking out from the shadows of retirement is acceptable, but can't compare to the impact of speaking to power on a routine basis. Undoubtedly, this will cost some leaders advancement, but that's what genuine leaders do. Nothing can be allowed to trump integrity, in all its forms and manifestations.

The military profession, like any profession, must continually evolve lest it become ineffective, irrelevant, or both. *"Trust in the military, although widespread today, is counterintuitive and inorganic to a representative government jealous of its liberty, and so trust needs constant care."*⁶⁴ The profession must always be striving to carry out its mandate more efficiently and effectively, to retain the respect of those it serves and protects. To that end, the points made above are a decent place to start. The American armed forces have a greater responsibility than just "the management of violence." We can't always choose the wars we get into, but where there are options other than the direct application of violence, the military still has a vital role to play, be it through sage advice, budgetary discipline, candor, diplomacy, deterrence, coercion, compliance, foreign assistance, or a host of other venues. As a profession, we owe it to ourselves and the country to sharpen not just the sword, but the mind and the pencil as well.

Notes

¹ Interview with Lt Gen Ervin J. Rokke, USAF (Ret), Senior Scholar in Residence at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), Center for Character and Leadership Development, 12 Aug 2014. Gen Rokke cited other “inflection points,” such the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna as examples.

² Andrew Bacevich, *Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 2013).

³ Alfred, Lord Tennyson, “The Charge of the Light Brigade” published in 1854.

⁴ Samuel Huntington felt loyalty and obedience were the highest military virtues.

⁵ Malham M. Wakin, “The American Military: Theirs To Reason Why,” in Malham M. Wakin, *Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Philosopher* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), 61. This chapter was originally published in *Air Force Magazine*, Feb 1971.

⁶ Ibid, 64.

⁷ Malham M. Wakin, “The Ethics of Leadership I,” in Malham M. Wakin, *Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Philosopher* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), 78. This chapter was originally published in *American Behavioral Scientist* 19, May/June 1976.

⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Boston: Belknap of Harvard University Press, 1957), 177.

⁹ Lt Col Ian Bryan, “Know Yourself Before the Enemy: Military Professionalism’s Civil Foundation,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011, 32.

¹⁰ Charles C. Moskos, Jr., “The All-Volunteer Military: Calling, Profession, or Occupation,” *Parameters*, Winter 2010-11, 24. The article was originally published in 1977 in *Parameters*.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid, 25.

¹³ Andrew J. Bacevich, “One Percent Republic,” *The American Conservative*, Dec 18, 2013, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/one-percent-republic/>, accessed 15 Aug 2014.

¹⁴ General George C. Marshall, as quoted in Phil Kay, "The 1 Percent Army: Andrew Bacevich on How America Lost the Military," *The Daily Beast*, 16 Sep 2013, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/16/the-1-army-andrew-bacevich-on-how-america-lost-the-military.html#>, accessed 15 Aug 2014.

¹⁵ Kay, "The 1 Percent Army"

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Joseph Califano, as quoted in Phil Kay, "The 1 Percent Army."

¹⁸ General Stanley McChrystal, as quoted in Phil Kay, "The 1 Percent Army."

¹⁹ Paulette Otis, "Religion and War in the Twenty-First Century," in *Religion and Security: The New Nexus in International Relations*, ed. Robert A. Seiple and Dennis R. Hoover (Lantham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 14

²⁰ See Jacques S. Gansler, *Democracy's Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).

²¹ Gansler, *Democracy's Arsenal*, 206.

²² Paul D. Eaton, "Professional Disagreement and Policy," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011, 23.

²³ Bryan, "Know Yourself Before the Enemy," 34.

²⁴ Malham M. Wakin, "The Vocation of Arms," in Malham M. Wakin, *Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Philosopher* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), 58. This chapter was originally published in *Air Force and Space Digest*, 46 (July 1963), 40-47.

²⁵ See Malham M. Wakin, "The Military: A Noble Profession," in Malham M. Wakin, *Integrity First: Reflections of a Military Philosopher* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2000), 105. This chapter was originally published in *Notre Dame Magazine*, Feb 1974.

²⁶ Jeffrey Record, "Why the Strong Lose," *Parameters* (Winter 2005), 24.

²⁷ Hew Strachen, "Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War," *Survival* 52, no. 5 (29 Sep 2010), 165.

²⁸ Dayne E. Nix, "American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. Huntington and the Political Dimensions of Military Professionalism," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2, 98.

²⁹ Ibid, 99.

³⁰ John T. Fishel, "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night," *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement Journal* 46, nos. 3/4 (Winter 1995), 372-98.

³¹ Thomas Hammes, "Rethinking the Principles of War," in *Rethinking the Principles of War*, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 273-77. Also see William S. Lind, "Understanding Fourth Generation War," *Antiwar.com*, 15 Jan 2004, <http://www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=1702>, accessed 31 Jul 2014.

³² For more on this issue, refer to Andrew M. Linder, "Controlling the Media in Iraq," *Contexts*, Spring 2008, <http://contexts.org/articles/spring-2008/controlling-the-media-in-iraq/>, accessed 31 Jul 2014.

³³ See Elizabeth Goitein and David M. Shapiro, *Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability*, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2011, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/LNS/Brennan_Overclassification_Final.pdf, accessed 31 Jul 2014.

³⁴ Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, as quoted in the Summary of Goitein and Shapiro, *Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability*.

³⁵ Goitein, as quoted in Melissa Steffan, "The high cost of keeping a secret," *The Washington Post*, 13 Oct 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/the-high-cost-of-keeping-a-secret/2011/09/13/gIQAFLE8gL_blog.html, accessed 31 Jul 2014.

³⁶ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd rev. ed. (1967; repr. Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1991), 338.

³⁷ This "revolt" refers to a series of incidents where, in 2006, several senior flag officers, all retired, spoke out publicly against both the military policies pursued in Iraq and the civilian leaders who were most responsible for them (i.e. President Bush, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, etc.). See Don M. Snider, "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions," *Strategic Studies Institute*, Feb 2008, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub849.pdf>, accessed 14 Jul 2014.

³⁸ And occasionally active-duty personnel, too; in this case, the situation is generally dealt with swiftly, as it should. If unable to support the policies, retire or resign; to do otherwise is a breach of one's oath.

³⁹ Snider, "Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions," 2.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Michael C. Desch, "Bush and the Generals," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 3, May-June 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/62616>, accessed 23 Jul 2014. Also see several responses to that article in

Richard B. Myers, Richard H. Kohn, Mackubin Thomas Owens, Lawrence J. Korb, and Michael Desch, "Salute and Disobey?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 5, September-October 2007, 147-156,
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/62843> accessed 23 Jul 2014.

⁴² As quoted in Desch, "Bush and the Generals."

⁴³ Desch, "Bush and the Generals."

⁴⁴ See H. R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*, New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997.

⁴⁵ General Colin Powell (Ret), as quoted in Desch, "Bush and the Generals."

⁴⁶ James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 44.

⁴⁷ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 184.

⁴⁸ General Colin Powell, as quoted in Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 185.

⁴⁹ Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, as quoted in Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 184.

⁵⁰ And maybe more than that. Cheney, in conjunction with some advisors, but unbeknownst to Powell, was drafting an entirely different campaign plan than the one the Combatant Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, had submitted in draft form. Schwarzkopf's rather conventional, headlong attack into Iraqi fielded forces was not well-received by the White House or the civilian leadership at the Pentagon. Then again, after Cheney secretly presented his alternative, that too, was frowned on, but for different reasons. In the end, a hybrid plan was devised that had more than a hint of Cheney's original plan baked into it.

⁵¹ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 191. Also see Fred Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

⁵² Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 519.

⁵³ See Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 270.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 304-5.

⁵⁷ Eric Schmitt, "Threats and Responses: Military Spending; Pentagon Contradicts General On Iraq Occupation Force's Size," *The New York Times*, 28 Feb 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/28/us/threats-responses-military-spending-pentagon-contradicts-general-iraq-occupation.html?pagewanted=print> accessed 24 Jul 2014.

⁵⁸ Paul Wolfowitz, as quoted in Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 53.

⁵⁹ Lt Gen Gregory Newbold, USMC (Ret), "Why Iraq Was a Mistake: A military leader sounds off against the war and the zealots who pushed it," *Time*, Apr 9, 2006,

<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1181629,00.html> , accessed 24 Jul 2014.

⁶⁰ Eaton, "Professional Disagreement and Policy," 24.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Admiral Leon A Edney, USN (Ret), "Keeping Integrity," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 62, 3d Quarter 2011, 21.

⁶³ Bryan, "Know Yourself Before the Enemy," 36.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 34.